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Macroeconomic impact of gas price shock 
 
Summary 
Being one of the most energy inefficient countries in the Europe, Ukraine has to 
import most of energy resources it needs. It makes the country extremely 
vulnerable to energy price shocks. It is especially true for gas that constitutes 
almost a half of total primary energy supply in Ukraine.  
In this paper we consider the impact of increased gas price resulted from January 
2006 agreement signed by Naftogaz Ukrainy, Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo. Using 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we analyzed the macroeconomic 
impact of the price shock and estimated necessary reduction in gas consumption 
that could be sufficient to compensate for increased prices.  
According to the model results, ceteris paribus the current gas price increase 
could lead to a 5.5% cumulative reduction of real GDP within medium-term 
horizon, being the most painful for  production of chemicals, plastics and rubber, 
for metallurgy and for industries that supply inputs for above-mentioned sectors. 
To compensate the increase in gas prices, economic agents have to introduce 
energy-saving technologies allowing decrease in energy intensity of the GDP by 
approximately 12%. The possible scenario is a reduction of gas consumption by 
approximately one third.  
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1 Introduction 
Being one of the most energy inefficient countries in the Europe, Ukraine has to 
import the lion share of energy resources it needs. It makes the country 
extremely vulnerable to energy price shocks. It is especially true for gas that 
constitutes almost a half of total primary energy supply in Ukraine, only slightly 
more than a quarter of which is produced domestically. 
Before January 2006 gas imports from Russia have been linked with gas transit 
services which Ukraine provided for Russian gas exports to Europe. For that 
Russia supplied gas to Ukraine. The rest of necessary gas balance Ukraine 
purchased directly in Central Asian countries, agreements which also envisaged 
in-kind payments. The January 2006 agreement1 signed by Naftogaz Ukrainy, 
Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo introduced a completely new system of gas trade 
and transport. First, the link between gas transit and gas supply to Ukraine was 
broken. Second, RosUkrEnergo became the monopolist supplier of both Russian 
and Central Asian gas to Ukraine. Third, and most important, gas price was 
sharply increased.  
The latter change is in the focus of this paper. Here, we make an attempt to 
estimate the macroeconomic effects of increased gas prices using the computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model as instrument of our analysis2. Also, we 
estimated the necessary reduction in gas consumption, i.e. introduction of 
energy-saving technologies that could be sufficient to compensate for increased 
gas prices.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes energy 
balance of Ukraine. Next, Section 3 presents scenarios used for the CGE 
simulations. Section 4 discusses results of simulation, including the estimate of 
required compensatory reduction in gas consumption. Section 5 concludes.  
2 Energy balance of Ukraine 
Ukraine is known as the most energy intensive countries in the Europe (Figure 
1)3. In 2002, according to World Bank estimates4, the  energy intensity in Ukraine 
is 22 times higher than in Germany on the GDP basis, and approximately 4 times 
higher than in Germany on purchasing power parity basis. Moreover, it is almost 
a half higher than energy intensity of energy-resources abundant Russia if 
estimated on the GDP basis.  
Gas dominates among various sources of energy used in Ukraine. It constitutes 
almost 47% of total primary energy resources supplied in Ukraine, followed by 
coal (29%) and crude oil  (21%). While crude oil is 100% used by petroleum 
refineries, gas is widely used by all sectors of the economy (Table 1). In 
particular, electricity and heat plants consume approximately 45% of gas supply, 
                                          
1 Detailed discussion of economic aspects of the agreement is provided in IER/GAG policy 
paper V4 “The Ukrainian-Russian gas agreement: An economic assessment” 
2 Since the CGE model is built on assumptions like perfect factor mobility and mandatory 
fiscal and trade balances, the result of the study should be taken with caution and 
considered as indicative.  
3 For other studies of energy intensity in Ukraine see Ukraine and the World Economy: Risk 
Assessment and Policy Recommendations and Towards Higher Standards of Living: An 
Economic Agenda for Ukraine at http://www.ier.kiev.ua/English/books_eng.cgi  
4 Ukraine. The Impact of Higher Natural Gas and Oil Prices. The World Bank, December 6, 
2005 
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while 51% of gas supply is directed for final consumption. Here, the gas is shared 
by households consumption (almost 21% of primary gas supply in thousand tones 
of oil equivalent), industrial consumption and commercial and public services. 
Among industries, primary consumers of gas are metallurgy and chemical 
industry. 
Figure 1 
Energy intensity of GDP for selected countries: 
total primary energy supply per thousand USD of GDP  
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Source: IEA (2002): Key world energy statistics. 
Table 1 
Energy Balance of Ukraine for key products in 2003, demand side  
(% of total primary energy supply measured in thousand tones of oil equivalent) 
CONSUMPTION Coal Crude oil Gas 
Total primary energy
supply 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Statistical Differences -1.9 0.0 0.0 
Electricity Plants -7.8 0.0 -25.8 
CHP Plants -32.8 0.0 0.0 
Heat Plants -6.6 0.0 -19.0 
Petroleum Refineries 0.0 -100.0 0.0 
Coal Transformation -25.4 0.0 0.0 
Own Use -0.3 0.0 -2.2 
Distribution Losses 0.0 0.0 -2.3 
Total final consumption 25.4 0.0 50.7 
Industry sector 19.7 0.0 18.3 
Residential consumption 5.7 0.0 20.8 
Other sectors 0.0 0.0 11.6 
Source: IEA 
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At the same time, domestic supply of energy resources in Ukraine is quite limited 
(Table 2). According to the IEA, Ukraine is reasonably self-sufficient only in 
supply of coal, the domestic production of which covers more than 90% of total 
primary coal supply. At the same time, domestic production of gas is at 28% of 
primary supply, forcing Ukraine to import the rest.  
Table 2 
Energy Balance of Ukraine for key products in 2003, supply side  
(% of total primary energy supply measured in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) 
SUPPLY  Coal Crude oil Gas 
Production 92.5 15.6 27.8 
Imports 14.1 90.4 80.0 
Exports -6.6 -6.0 -7.7 
Total primary energy supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: IEA 
Key sources of gas imports for Ukraine are Russia and Central Asia countries, 
namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Table 3). Moreover, recently 
the role of Turkmenistan in gas imports has significantly increased. However, as 
Central Asian gas can be supplied to Ukraine only through Russia, the latter is de 
facto strategic supplier of gas to Ukraine.  
Table 3 
Gas imports, % of trade weight 
 2000 2001 2002 
Russian Federation 66.4 51.0 48.5 
Turkmenistan 29.9 44.4 49.2 
Uzbekistan 3.6 4.6 0.3 
Kazakhstan 0.1 0.0 1.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: UN ComTrade database, author’s estimates 
3 Model scenarios 
To estimate the impact of changed gas price on Ukraine’s economy we use the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for Ukraine5. In this paper we 
simulate the following two scenarios: 
Scenario 1 “Shock”. In this scenario we consider the consequences of the price 
shock after the increased import gas prices is transferred to consumers. 
According to our estimates, the gas price will increase by 60% compared to the 
benchmark6.  
                                          
5 The CGE model was developed by the consortium of Copenhagen Economics (Denmark), 
Institute for East European Studies Munich (Germany) and Institute for Economic Research 
and Policy Consulting (Ukraine) within the framework of project “Analysis of Economic 
Impacts of Ukraine’s Accession to the WTO” (2005).  
6 The benchmark price is estimated assuming the following structure of imported gas 
supply: Ukraine imports from Russia 30 bcm of gas at USD 50 and 4 bcm at USD 80. Also, 
Ukraine imports 24 bcm at USD 68 (net of transit payments) from Turkmenistan. Thus, the 
weighted average benchmark price of gas is approximately USD 60. The new USD 95 gas 
price is assumed.  
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Scenario 2 “Shock + energy saving”. This is a policy scenario where we 
simulate the necessary reduction in gas consumption that could be sufficient to 
compensate for the current gas price shock studied in Scenario 17.    
The rest of the paper is devoted to description of simulation results.  
4 Results of the CGE model 
Before we start discussing the results of our modelling exercise in detail, several 
general points must be mentioned: 
The time horizon of our analysis is not explicitly fixed. Rather, our model 
specification with e.g. flexible factor (i.e. labour and capital) market adjustments 
implies that scenario results describe the full adjustment of the economy after an 
external shock has occurred. Typically, this can be understood as a medium term 
perspective over 7-10 years. 
All results give changes of the respective variable relative to the benchmark year 
of our assessment (2002). Results do not give indications concerning the 
adjustment path from benchmark to the new equilibrium. 
The results isolate the economic impacts of gas price increase from all other 
events that in reality affect economic development at the same time. This 
includes changes in other world prices, changes in relative exchange rates of 
other currencies (e.g. US dollar and euro), and all other possible shocks that 
might occur during the same period. 
Table 4 
Economy-wide effects of gas price increase* 
 
Scenario 1: 
shock 
Scenario 2: 
shock + energy saving 
Change in real GDP, % -5.5 0.0 
Total change in welfare, % -19.6 0.2 
     --- urban non-poor households -24.2 0.4 
     --- urban poor households -4.7 -1.0 
     --- rural non-poor households -20.5 0.3 
     --- rural poor households -2.7 -0.6 
Changes in real factor wage, %   
     --- skilled labour -7.4 -0.1 
     --- unskilled labour -7.3 -0.1 
     --- capital -3.8 -0.5 
Factor adjustment costs, %   
     --- skilled labour 6.1 0.5 
     --- unskilled labour 10.7 0.8 
     --- capital 3.5 0.5 
Change in real exports of goods and services, %  -8.2 0.0 
Change in real imports of goods and services, % -6.9 -0.8 
Change in the shadow price of foreign exchange, % 3.1 -0.9 
Energy use coefficient:   
     --- for gas 1.00 0.64 
Source: author’s estimate 
                                          
7 The sufficient compensation is achieved when the real GDP remains unchanged 
as a result of gas price shock.   
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Note: * These results represent cumulative change over medium-term horizon 
(7-10 years) 
As shown in Table 4, the current increase in gas price (Scenario 1) results in 
significant deterioration of economic development. In particular, a cumulative 
medium-term reduction in real GDP is estimated at 5.5%, while a welfare will 
drop by 19.6% cumulatively. The worsening of welfare is explained by reduction 
of aggregate output, first of all in gas-intensive industries, and associated with 
that drop in wages by 7.4% for skilled and by 7.3% for unskilled employees. 
Depreciation of currency provoked by higher value of gas imports does not 
benefit exports (the latter will drop by 8.2% cumulatively), since export-oriented 
industries are at the same time industries that consume the most of gas. 
Adjustment to a new equilibrium economy requires significant factor adjustment. 
In particular, 10.7% of unskilled employees and 6.1% of skilled are to change 
their jobs. 
Among the sectors that suffered the most are chemical industry and metallurgy, 
as well as linked to them production of non-energy materials (e.g. iron ore) and 
production of coke (see Annex A for tables). Keeping all other things unchanged, 
the cumulative reduction of real aggregate output may reach 85% in chemical 
industry and 79% in metallurgy in medium-term horizon, both due to low 
domestic supply and exports. Taking into account that metallurgy and chemical 
industry account for more than one third of Ukraine’s exports, it explains the 
most of expected export reduction. 
At the same time, the economy adjusts to the shock via reallocation of resources 
to other sectors. In our case gains are distributed among sectors that consume 
less gas or gas-intensive products. These are, first of all, service sectors like 
hotels and restaurants, and such manufacturing industries as machinery and 
equipment, textile and leather, and woodworking and publishing.  
The most significant welfare reduction is faced by urban non-poor households 
that possess both labour and capital endowments and that will suffer the most 
from drop in industrial production. Also, these households are primary consumers 
of gas supply, electricity and heat, the price for which will increase most 
significantly.  
To compensate gas price shock, it is necessary to adopt energy-saving 
technologies, thus effectively reduce the demand for gas in the economy. 
Scenario 2 estimates by how much gas demand is to be reduced by sectors of the 
economy to compensate the current gas price shock8.  
As shown in Table 4, to return the real GDP to the previous level, the economy 
has to go into considerable structural changes, implementing energy-saving 
technologies and preventing the waste of energy resources. One of the possible 
scenarios (simulated for this paper) will be a reduction of gas use by 36%.  
The realisation of this scenario will require reallocation of resources. In particular, 
0.5% of skilled employees and 0.8% of unskilled will have to change their jobs. 
However, most of the sectors will either grow or suffer only minor reduction (see 
Annex A for tables).  
Being significant, the structural change required to compensate for the current 
price shock is not outrageous. As it was shown in Section 2, Ukraine’s energy 
intensity is the highest in Europe, thus a significant room for energy efficiency 
improvement exits. Moreover, the proposed reduction in gas consumption is 
                                          
8 In the paper the energy use coefficient is applied only to energy consumption by sectors 
of the economy, but not by households.  
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equivalent to approximately 12% reduction in energy intensity of the GDP, still 
leaving Ukraine’s energy intensity at the level far above the European average.   
5 Conclusions  
The analysis of macroeconomic impact of gas price growth initiated by the 
January Russian-Ukrainian gas agreement showed that Ukraine is extremely 
vulnerably to gas price shock. The estimated impact of current gas price increase 
is a 5.5% cumulative reduction of real GDP in medium-term horizon and almost 
20% cumulative drop in total welfare. The shock of gas price will be most painful 
for production of chemicals, plastics and rubber, for metallurgy and for industries 
that supply inputs for above-mentioned sectors. To adjust to a new – lower - 
equilibrium, 10.7% of unskilled and 6.1% of skilled workers are to change their 
jobs.  
To compensate the increased gas price, economic agents have to introduce 
energy-saving technologies allowing reduction in gas consumption. One of 
possible scenarios is 36% reduction in gas consumption. It is equivalent to an 
approximately 12% reduction in energy intensity of Ukraine’s GDP.  
Being significant, the required structural change is not outrageous. Being one of 
most energy inefficient countries in  Europe, Ukraine has a great potential for fast 
improvement if proper reforms are introduced.  
 
Author: VM 
Lector: FP 
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Table A1 
Percentage change in real aggregate output (cumulative) 
 Scenario 1: 
shock 
Scenario 2: 
shock + energy 
saving 
Agriculture, hunting 
16.7 -1.5 
Forestry 
37.5 -2.2 
Fishery 
13.1 -1.6 
Coal and peat 
-40.7 0.9 
Hydrocarbons - oil 
5.9 -1.1 
Hydrocarbons - gas 
12.6 7.4 
Non-energy materials 
-62.7 1.1 
Food-processing 
19.2 -1.8 
Textile and leather 
89.5 -5.0 
Wood working, pulp and paper industry, publishing 
52.6 -3.7 
Coke products 
-61.8 1.8 
Petroleum refinement 
2.1 -1.0 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
-85.0 8.7 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
-19.0 -0.5 
Metallurgy and metal processing 
-78.6 2.9 
Machinery and equipment 
74.9 -6.0 
Other production 
-14.7 -1.1 
Electric energy and heat supply 
-19.1 0.3 
Gas supply 
-29.4 1.2 
Water supply 
-6.8 -0.4 
Construction 
3.7 -0.9 
Trade 
-2.6 -1.2 
Hotels and restaurants 
225.2 -5.0 
Transport 
-6.3 -0.7 
Pipeline transit of oil and gas 
-3.8 -1.2 
Telecommunication 
-4.6 -0.6 
Postal services 
-4.0 -0.7 
Financial intermediation 
3.7 -0.8 
Real estate transactions 
-4.0 -0.6 
Renting 
4.4 -1.1 
Informatisation activities 
19.5 -1.6 
Research and development 
22.0 -1.8 
Services to legal entities 
10.5 -1.4 
Public administration 
5.0 -0.7 
Education 
0.8 -0.5 
Health care and social assistance 
-0.6 -0.5 
Sewage, cleaning of streets and refuse disposal 
-6.4 -0.5 
Social activities 
-13.9 -0.3 
Recreational, entertainment, cultural and sporting activities 
-4.2 -0.5 
Other activities 
-8.2 -0.5 
Source: author’s estimates  
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Table A2 
Percentage change in real domestic supply (cumulative) 
 Scenario 1: 
shock 
Scenario 2: 
shock + energy 
saving 
Agriculture, hunting 
11.6 -1.3 
Forestry 
11.0 -1.3 
Fishery 
9.1 -1.3 
Coal and peat 
-41.9 1.0 
Hydrocarbons - oil 
4.8 -1.0 
Hydrocarbons - gas 
35.2 30.0 
Non-energy materials 
-64.7 1.8 
Food-processing 
12.9 -1.5 
Textile and leather 
105.5 -5.5 
Wood working, pulp and paper industry, publishing 
40.8 -3.1 
Coke products 
-64.1 2.1 
Petroleum refinement 
-0.7 -0.8 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
-76.3 6.5 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
-16.0 -0.5 
Metallurgy and metal processing 
-67.2 2.0 
Machinery and equipment 
48.7 -4.6 
Other production 
-10.4 -0.6 
Electric energy and heat supply 
-18.7 0.3 
Gas supply 
-29.4 1.2 
Water supply 
-6.8 -0.4 
Construction 
3.5 -0.9 
Trade 
-2.6 -1.2 
Hotels and restaurants 
46.2 -2.4 
Transport 
-7.6 -0.6 
Pipeline transit of oil and gas 
  
Telecommunication 
-6.9 -0.5 
Postal services 
-5.8 -0.6 
Financial intermediation 
3.1 -0.8 
Real estate transactions 
-5.9 -0.5 
Renting 
1.4 -1.0 
Informatisation activities 
5.5 -1.0 
Research and development 
15.8 -1.5 
Services to legal entities 
8.6 -1.3 
Public administration 
4.9 -0.7 
Education 
0.4 -0.5 
Health care and social assistance 
-0.9 -0.4 
Sewage, cleaning of streets and refuse disposal 
-6.4 -0.5 
Social activities 
-13.9 -0.3 
Recreational, entertainment, cultural and sporting activities 
-4.4 -0.4 
Other activities 
-8.3 -0.5 
Source: author’s estimates  
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Table A3 
Percentage change in real exports (cumulative) 
 Scenario 1: 
shock 
Scenario 2: 
shock + energy 
saving 
Agriculture, hunting 
56.1 -3.2 
Forestry 
97.8 -4.4 
Fishery 
37.9 -3.0 
Coal and peat 
-15.8 -1.4 
Hydrocarbons - oil 
10.9 -1.2 
Hydrocarbons - gas 
-49.3 -55.0 
Non-energy materials 
-59.7 0.0 
Food-processing 
44.7 -3.1 
Textile and leather 
79.6 -4.7 
Wood working, pulp and paper industry, publishing 
74.2 -4.7 
Coke products 
-47.4 -0.3 
Petroleum refinement 
7.9 -1.4 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
-90.1 9.8 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
-32.2 -0.5 
Metallurgy and metal processing 
-82.6 3.1 
Machinery and equipment 
95.4 -7.2 
Other production 
-19.5 -1.7 
Electric energy and heat supply 
-43.0 1.2 
Gas supply 
  
Water supply 
  
Construction 
26.5 -2.5 
Trade 
30.0 -3.1 
Hotels and restaurants 
336.7 -6.8 
Transport 
10.3 -2.2 
Pipeline transit of oil and gas 
-3.8 -1.2 
Telecommunication 
37.0 -2.8 
Postal services 
33.9 -2.8 
Financial intermediation 
47.6 -2.9 
Real estate transactions 
25.9 -2.4 
Renting 
39.4 -2.9 
Informatisation activities 
63.5 -3.5 
Research and development 
66.2 -3.8 
Services to legal entities 
55.5 -3.4 
Public administration 
46.9 -3.0 
Education 
44.5 -2.9 
Health care and social assistance 
35.0 -2.6 
Sewage, cleaning of streets and refuse disposal 
  
Social activities 
  
Recreational, entertainment, cultural and sporting activities 
34.1 -2.6 
Other activities 
19.8 -2.3 
Source: author’s estimates  
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Table A4 
Percentage change in real imports (cumulative) 
 Scenario 1: 
shock 
Scenario 2: 
shock + energy 
saving 
Agriculture, hunting 
-8.6 -0.2 
Forestry 
-21.3 0.6 
Fishery 
-5.3 -0.4 
Coal and peat 
-53.4 2.4 
Hydrocarbons - oil 
1.7 -1.0 
Hydrocarbons - gas 
-4.7 -4.0 
Non-energy materials 
-67.3 2.9 
Food-processing 
-36.1 2.5 
Textile and leather 
-4.0 -0.5 
Wood working, pulp and paper industry, publishing 
-2.1 -0.3 
Coke products 
-71.4 3.6 
Petroleum refinement 
-5.1 -0.5 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 
4.7 -0.2 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
27.0 -0.2 
Metallurgy and metal processing 
4.4 -0.8 
Machinery and equipment 
-8.5 0.1 
Other production 
-4.2 0.0 
Electric energy and heat supply 
0.6 -0.3 
Gas supply 
  
Water supply 
  
Construction 
-8.3 0.1 
Trade 
-18.1 -0.1 
Hotels and restaurants 
-24.1 0.4 
Transport 
-10.8 -0.2 
Pipeline transit of oil and gas 
  
Telecommunication 
-16.8 0.1 
Postal services 
-23.8 0.7 
Financial intermediation 
-7.6 -0.2 
Real estate transactions 
-20.9 0.6 
Renting 
-16.2 0.2 
Informatisation activities 
-9.1 -0.2 
Research and development 
-6.8 -0.1 
Services to legal entities 
-12.5 0.0 
Public administration 
-14.3 0.8 
Education 
-19.3 1.0 
Health care and social assistance 
-17.7 0.9 
Sewage, cleaning of streets and refuse disposal 
  
Social activities 
  
Recreational, entertainment, cultural and sporting activities 
-22.0 0.9 
Other activities 
  
Source: author’s estimates  
